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THE SECTION 110(5) EXEMPTION FOR RADIO
PLAY IN COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS: A
NARROWLY CONSTRUED MUSIC COPYRIGHT
HAVEN
by Robert Thorne*
If the rights under the copyright flaw] are infringed only by a
performance where money is taken at the door, they are very
imperfectly protected'
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
INTRODUCTION
The federal circuit courts in Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc. 2 and
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. United States Shoe Corp. I recently tuned in to
section 110(5) of the Copyright Act4 which, under certain circum-
stances, provides for royalty-free radio play of copyrighted musical
compositions in commercial establishments.'
Radio broadcasting stations must obtain licenses from and pay
royalties to owners of the copyrighted musical compositions they
* © 1983 Robert Thorne. All rights reserved.
Robert Thorne is associated with the Los Angeles firm of Lavely d Singer and is editor-in-
chief of the Century City Bar Association Journal and contributing editor of the Entertain-
ment Law Reporter. A member of Phi Beta Kappa, he received his B.A. Degree with highest
honors and distinctionfrom the University of California at Berkeley (1977) and his J. D. Degree
from Hastings College of the Law (1980).
1. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 594-95 (1917).
2. 688 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2012 (1982).
3. 678 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1982).
4. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 etseq. (1976) (effective January 1, 1978) [hereinafter referred to as
the Act]. The Act superseded 17 U.S.C. §§ I et seq. (1970) (originally enacted as Act of
March 4, 1909 ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075) (hereinafter referred to as the 1909 Act].
5. This article focuses on commercial reception of radio broadcast music. Reception
for private use has always been beyond the reach of copyright law. See generally infra note
50. For instance, it is undisputed that "the owner of a private radio receiving set who in his
own home invites friends to hear a musical composition which is being broadcast would not
be liable for infringement. For, even if this be deemed a performance, it is neither public
nor for profit." Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 196 (1931). On a more
fundamental level, the Supreme Court even found occasion to assure the public that "[njo
license i required. . . to sing a copyrighted lyric in the shower." Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 155 (1975). (emphasis added).
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broadcast.6 Section 110(5) provides, however, that commercial estab-
lishments receiving the radio broadcasts are exempt from the licensing
and royalty requirements if they use a "single radio receiver of a kind
commonly used in private homes," no direct charge is made to hear the
transmission and the transmission is not further transmitted to the pub-
lic.7 Such "performances" do not fall within the scope of section 106(4)
of the Act which recognizes the exclusive rights of copyright owners to
publicly perform or authorize the public performance of their musical
6. It is well settled that a broadcast of a copyrighted musical composition by a commer-
cial radio station constitutes a public performance. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 158-59 (1975); Associated Music Publishers, Inc. v. Debs Memorial
Radio Fund, 141 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1944); cf. Chappell & Co., Ltd. v. Associated Radio Co.
of Australia, Ltd., Vict. L.R. 350 (1925); Messager v. British Broadcasting Co.. Ltd.. 2 K.B.
543 (1927), rev'don other grounds, 1 K.B. 660 (1928), affrd A.C. 151 (1929); Jerome H. Rem-
ick & Co. v. General Electric Co., 16 F.2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1926); Jerome H. Remick & Co. v.
American Automobile Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1925); see general Caldwell,
The Broadcasting of Copyrighted Works, I J.AIR L. 584 (1930).
In one of the earliest cases so holding, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
explained:
While the fact that the radio was not developed at the time the Copyright Act...
was enacted may raise some question as to whether it properly comes within the
purview of the statute, it is not by that fact alone excluded from the statute. In
other words, the statute may be applied to new situations not anticipated by Con-
gress, if, fairly construed, such situations come within its intent and meaning ....
While statutes should not be stretched to apply to new situations not fairly within
their scope they should not be so narrowly construed as to permit their evasion
because of changing habits due to new inventions and discoveries.
A performance, in our judgment, is no less public because the listeners are unable
to communicate with one another, or are not assembled within an inclosure. or
gathered together in some open stadium or park or other public place. Nor can a
performance, in our judgment, be deemed private because each listener may enjoy
it alone in the privacy of his home. Radio broadcasting is intended to, and does,
reach a very much larger number of the public at the moment of rendition than
any other medium of performance. The artist is consciously addressing a great,
though unseen and widely scattered, audience, and is therefore participating in a
public performance.
Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Automobile Co., 5 F.2d 411, 411-12 (6th Cir. 1925),
quoted in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 158-59 (1975).
The unlicensed radio broadcaster runs the risk of liability for infringing the copyright
owner's exclusive right to publicly perform the copyrighted musical composition. For the
statutory definition of "public performance," see infra note 8.
7. Section 110 of the Act provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of § 106, the following are not infringements of
copyright:
(5) communication of a transmission embodying a performance or display of a
work by the public reception of the transmission on a single receiving apparatus of
a kind commonly used in private homes, unless-
(A) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or




A broad spectrum of irreconcilable decisional authority9 preceded
the enactment of section 110(5).I" The United States Supreme Court's
failure to steer a straight course in this field of law led Congress to
enact this limited" exemption for radio play in commercial establish-
ments. The House Committee sponsoring 110(5) expressly considered
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 2 a 1975 decision of the
8. Section 106 of the Act provides in relevant part:
Subject to §§ 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclu-
sive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
* . •
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works.
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly . . . .(emphasis added).
Section 101 of the Act defines "public performance" as follows:
To perform or display a work "publicly" means-
(I) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to
a place specified in clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process,
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display
receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at differ-
ent times.
The 1909 Act provided at section I in relevant part:
Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this title, shall
have the exclusive right:
(3) To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical
composition; ....
"When this statutory provision was enacted in 1909, its purpose was to prohibit unauthor-
ized performances of copyrighted musical compositions in such places as concert halls, thea-
ters, restaurants, and cabarets." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 157
(1975), citing H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909).
9. For other commentaries on § I 10(5)'s judicial antecedents, see Korman, Performance
Rights in Music Under Sections 110 and 118 of the 1976 Copyright Act, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 521 11977): 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8.18 (1980); Note, When is a
Performance Not a Performance?-Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken and Its CA TV
Precedents. 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 607 (1976); Note, Narrowing the Scope of the Copyright Act
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 752 (1975); Note, Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken-Infringement Liability of a Restaurant Owner for Reception of
Radio Broadcastfor the Enjoyment of His Customers, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 201 (1977); Note,
Exclusive Right to Perform Copyrighted Worker Publiclyfor Profit not Infringed by Radio
Entertainment of Restaurant Patrons, Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151
(1975)," 80 DIcK. L. REV. 328 (1975); Note, The Meaning of 'Performance' Under the Copy-
right Act, Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975), 7 U. TOL. L. REV.
705 (1976); Note, Proprietor of Commercial Establishment Does Not Perform Copyrighted
Music when He Amplifies a Licensed Radio Broadcast through Radio Receiver and Loudspeak-
ers--Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 500 F2d 127 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 419
U.S 1067 (1974), 63 GEO. L.J. 1001 (1975).
10. See generally infra note 101.
I1. See generally infra notes I 10 and 118 and accompanying text.
12. 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
1983]
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Supreme Court in which a fast-food restaurateur who used a radio re-
ceiver with four ceiling speakers for the benefit of his employees and
customers was found not to have performed the copyrighted music he
received and therefore was not an infringer. 13 The Committee con-
cluded that the facts in Aiken represent the "outer limit" of the section
110(5) exemption.'4
Considering the articulate legislative history of section 110(5), it
came as no surprise that the courts in Sailor Music and U.S. Shoe
Corp. narrowly construed that music copyright haven. After all, in
both cases the infringing retail stores exceeded the "outer limit" ex-
pressed in Aiken, as those establishments were substantially larger and
had more elaborate sound systems.' 5 Section 110(5) was the necessary
antidote to the ills of its judicial antecedents. The narrow construction
of section 110(5) has helped to define its parameters, characterizing it
as a de minimis exemption and thereby affording songwriters the
financial reward they deserve for the product of their creative efforts.
This article will examine the judicial antecedents of section 110(5)
and will discuss its legislative history, its provisions and the courts' re-
cent analyses in Sailor Music and U.S. Shoe Corp.
THE JUDICIAL ANTECEDENTS
The Concept of "Performance" in its Infancy
Justice Holmes observed in 1917 that "[i]f the rights under the
copyright [law] are infringed only by a performance where money is
taken at the door, they are very imperfectly protected."' 6 This observa-
tion was at the root of the Supreme Court's decision in Herbert v. Shan-
ley Co. '7 There, the Court held that the live rendition of a copyrighted
composition by an orchestra in a hotel dining room, even without
13. The House Committee articulately evaluated Aiken in proposing legislation thai, in
a slightly different form, became section 110(5) of the Act. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), at 87.
14. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
15. The fast-food restaurant in Aiken was 1,055 square feet, with only 620 square feet
open to the public; in contrast, one of the infringing retail clothing stores in Sailor Music was
2,769 square feet. Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc., 668 F.2d 84, 86 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 2012 (1982). Of the three infringing retail clothing stores in US Shoe
Corp., two occupied approximately 5,000 square feet and the other was approximately 9,000
square feet. Appellee's Brief, at 16, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 678 F.2d 816
(9th Cir. 1982). As for the sound systems used in the defendant establishments in Aiken,
Sailor Music and U.S. Shoe Corp., see infra notes 126, 133 and 135, respectively, and accom-
panying text.
16. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 594-95 (1917).
17. Id. at 591.
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charge for admission to hear it, was a public performance for profit
within the meaning of the 1909 Act.'" Therefore, the unlicensed hotel
had infringed the copyright owner's exclusive right to perform the com-
position publicly for profit.
In delivering the opinion of the Court, and showing marked defer-
ence to copyright proprietorship,' 9 Justice Holmes further explained:
Performances not different in kind from those of the defen-
dant could be given that might compete with and even destroy
the success of the monopoly that the law intends the plaintiffs
to have. It is enough to say that there is no need to construe
the statute so narrowly. The defendants' performances are
not eleemosynary. They are part of a total for which the pub-
18. Id at 594-95.
19. In expressing his concern that copyright owners be remunerated and their monopoly
protected, Justice Holmes did not mention the competing, theoretically paramount interests
of the listening public. It bears repeating that almost 200 years ago, Lord Mansfield warned
in Sayre v. Moore, quoted in a footnote to Cary v. Longman, 1 East 358, 362 n.(b), 102 Eng.
Rep. 138, 140 n.(b) (1801):
[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one,
that men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of the community
may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and
labor; other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress
of the arts be retarded.
More recently, the American judiciary has recognized the competing interests the copyright
law must accommodate. In Aiken, the Court observed:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the limited
copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing
claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded,
but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and the other arts..
422 U.S. at 156.
These competing interests theoretically have been accommodated by a prioritization,
with the public's interest in access being preferred to the interests of the copyright owner and
his assignee to be remunerated and to control their markets. This writer has observed:
The primary purpose of the copyright law is to ensure that authors' works are
accessible to the public; the secondary purpose is to remunerate authors by grant-
ing them enforceable, commercially exploitable rights which encourage creativity
and public dissemination of the products of their creativity.
Thorne, Compulsory Licensing. The Music Makers as Money Makers, 5 L.A. Law. 14 (1982),
reprinted in 1 ENr. & SPORTs LAW., Winter 1983, at !1 (1983) (footnote omitted). See
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156; Mazer v. Stein, 247 U.S. 201,
reh'g denied, 347 U.S. 949 (1954); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932); see
also H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1909).
The tendency of the courts would be to at least implicitly tip the scales decidedly in
favor of one or the other of these competing interests to support and justify any given deci-
sion reached. For instance, in Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917), Justice Holmes
exhibited a paramount concern for copyright owners; the Court decided in their favor. In
contrast, in Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, the Court tipped the scales in favor of the listening public
and emphasized that thepublic's accessibility to the arts is the primary object of the copyright
law; the copyright owners in Aiken lost.
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lic pays, and the fact that the price of the whole is attributed
to a particular item which those present are expected to order
is not important. It is true that the music is not the sole ob-
ject, but neither is the food, which probably could be got
cheaper elsewhere. The object is a repast in surroundings that
to people having limited powers of conversation, or disliking
the rival noise, give luxurious pleasure not to be had from
eating a silent meal. If music did not pay, it would be given
up. If it pays, it pays out of the public's pocket. Whether it
pays or not, the purpose of employing it is profit, and that is
enough.2°
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit similarly noted in 1925
that "it is against a commercial as distinguished from a purely philan-
thropic public use of another's composition, that the [copyright law] is
directed.'
Shortly thereafter, in Buck v. Debaum,22 a district court chose not
to extend Herbert to enjoin the radio play of a copyrighted musical
composition in a cafe for the enjoyment of its patrons. The court con-
ceded that under Herbert the use of the copyrighted music constituted
public reception for profit but held that the cafe owner did not "per-
form" the music, and on that basis Herbert was distinguished. The de-
cision turned on the fact that the broadcasting station was licensed and
expressly authorized by the copyright owners to publicly perform the
compositions.23 The court rejected the copyright owners' contention
that the licensed radio broadcast should be received with immunity
only for private use and not by "those who install radio receiving sets
in public places and who use them as an adjunct and auxiliary to their
business."24 Instead, said the court, by licensing the broadcast the
copyright owners "impliedly sanctioned and consented to any 'pick up'
out of the air that was possible in radio reception. 25
20. 242 U.S. at 594-95.
21. Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Automobile Accessories Co.. 5 F.2d 411, 412
(6th Cir. 1925).
22. 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929).
23. "[lit is the grant of such privilege or license by the owners of the copyright to the
broadcasting station," the court asserted, "that is the determining factor that disables the
complainants herein from enjoining or preventing the defendant from 'picking up' through
this radio receiving set the 'Indian Love Cal,' and imparting the same audibly to the patrons





The court further explained its holding that the reception of a li-
censed broadcast, even for profit, is not a performance:
The performance in such case takes place in the studio of the
broadcasting station, and the operator of the receiving set in
effect does nothing more than one would do who opened a
window and permitted the strains of music of a passing band
to come within the inclosure in which he was located.2 6
After Debaum, it seemed that the only protection available to
copyright owners interested in controlling and profiting from such use
of their music was to refuse to grant performance licenses to broadcast-
ing stations. 27
The Doctrine of Multiple Performances Emerges-A Quantitative Test
In 1931, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide Buck v. Jew-
ell-La Salle Realty Co. ,28 a case involving public reception, in a hotel,
of an unlicensed radio broadcast. The defendant hotel maintained a
master radio receiver wired to each of its public and private rooms and
repeatedly received broadcasts of a copyrighted public song owned by
the plaintiffs. The dispositive facts were that the radio broadcasting
station was unlicensed and the music received was rechanneled into
additional areas throughout the hotel.
Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, seemed to -.yprove of but
distinguished the district court's earlier holding in Buck v. Debaum. He
remarked, although only in a footnote:
If the copyrighted composition had been broadcast with
plaintiffs" consent, a license for its commercial reception and dis-
tribution by the hotel company might possibly have been im-
plied Compare Buck v. Debaum. But [the radio broadcasting
station] was not licensed- and the position of the hotel company
is not unlike that of one who publicy performs for profit by the
use of an unlicensed phonograph record.29
The fact that the radio broadcasting station in Jewell-La Salle was
unlicensed, was perhaps not the only ground for distinguishing the case
from Buck v. Debaum. The Court in Jewell-La Salle recognized that
the defendant hotel employed a "distributing apparatus" to amplify the
26. Id
27. The court remarked that "It]he owner of a copyrighted musical composition can
fully protect himself against any unauthorized invasion of his property right by refusing to
license the broadcasting station to perform his musical composition." Id. at 736.
28. 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
29. id. at 199 n.5. (emphasis added).
19831
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broadcast program throughout the hotel and not simply in the room
housing its radio receiver.3° Justice Brandeis observed:
In addition, the ordinary receiving set, and the distributing
apparatus here employed by the hotel company are equipped
to amplify the broadcast program after it has been received.
Such acts clearly are more than the use of mere mechanical
acoustic devices for the better hearing of the original
program.
31
The cafe receiving the radio broadcast in Debaum did not channel the
music into other rooms; there, the radio reception was intramural. Of
course, the Court in Jewell-La Salle might have reached its result even
absent this distinction, yet the distinction is no less apparent.
What is perhaps most striking about the Court's opinion in Jewell-
La Salle is that the Court was unimpressed with the defendant's con-
tention that there can be but one performance each time a copyrighted
composition is aired.3" "No reason is suggested," wrote Justice Bran-
deis, "why there may not be more than one liability."33
The doctrine of multiple performances was born.34 What the de-
fendant does to bring about the reception was to be determinative. The
reception of the radio broadcast in Jewell-La Salle, with the rechannel-
ing of the music throughout the hotel, was found to be more than "a
mere audition of the original program."35 The Court fancied the anal-
ogy of a radio receiver to a recording stylus:
The modulation of the radio waves in the transmitting appa-
ratus, by the audible sound waves, is comparable to the man-
ner in which the wax phonograph record is impressed by the
same waves through the medium of a recording stylus. The
transmitted radio waves require a receiving set for their detec-
tion and translation into audible sound waves, just as the rec-
ord requires another mechanism for the reproduction of the
recorded composition. In neither case is the original program
heard; and, in the former, complicated electrical instrumen-
talities are necessary for adequate reception and distribution.
30. Id at 195.
31. Id at 201.
32. Id at 198.
33. d. -
34. The Court in Jewell-La Salle did not actually use the words "multiple perfor-
mances," but the court clearly found there had been two performances. See generally 2 M.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8.181C)[1], at 8-198-201 (1981).
35. 283 U.S. at 199-200.
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Reproduction in both cases amounts to a performance. 36
The defendant further argued that the hotel did not choose or in-
tend to infringe as it "cannot render at will a performance of any com-
position, but must accept whatever program is transmitted during the
broadcast period."' 3" The Court simply reiterated the well-settled prin-
ciple that "[i]ntention to infringe is not essential under the [copyright
law]."3 One who "tunes in on a radio broadcasting station," the Court
warned, "necessarily assumes the risk that in doing so he may infringe
the performing rights of another. ' 39
A Shift to the Functional Test in the Cable Television Cases
The issue regarding performance was not laid to rest in Jewell-La
Salle. In 1968, the Supreme Court decided Fortnightly Corp. v. United
Artists Television Corp. 4 0 This was an action for infringement of United
Artists' copyrights in motion pictures by Fortnightly's community an-
tenna television systems in Clarksburg and Fairmont, West Virginia.
Due to the hilly terrain in those cities, most residents could not receive
ordinary television broadcasts. The majority of the residents sub-
scribed, for a charge, to Fortnightly's CATV service. The service sim-
ply enhanced local broadcast signals. United Artists unsuccessfully
sued Fortnightly for copyright infringement. As a result of Fortnightly,
under the 1909 Act, cable television operators were free from copyright
liability."'
36. Id at 200-01. (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 198.
38. Id (citations omitted).
39. Id. (citations omitted).
40. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
41. Fortnightly has been preempted as of January 1, 1978 by section III of the Act
which generally provides that an unauthorized retransmission of a television broadcast by a
cable system constitutes copyright infringement unless the secondary transmitter obtains a
compulsory license permitting such use and pays the required royalties. The compulsory
license, by definition, is generally obtainable as a matter of right, even over the objection of
the copyright owner.
The House Report accompanying the Act stated the following with respect to the enact-
ment of§ IIl:
In general, the Committee believed that cable systems are commercial enterprises
whose basic retransmission operations are based on the carriage of copyrighted
material and that copyright royalties should bepaid by cable operators to the creators
of such programs. The Committee recognizes, however, that it would be impracti-
cal and unduly burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with every
copyright owner whose work was retransmitted by a cable system. Accordingly,
the Committee had determined to maintain the basic principle of the Senate bill to
establish a compulsory license for the retransmission of those over-the-air broad-
cast signals that a cable system is authorized to carry pursuant to the rules and
regulations of the FCC.
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The Court stated that the quantitative test formulated and adopted
in Jewell-La Salle had no application in the television broadcasting
field. 2 If "mere quantitative contribution" were the test, the Court
warned in terrorem, "many people who make large contributions to
television might find themselves liable for copyright infringement
... , The Court instead focused on "the function that CATV plays
in the total process of television broadcasting and reception."" The
Court thus discarded the quantitative test and chose to apply its new
functional test.
The essence of the Court's opinion was its professed dichotomy:
"Broadcaster's perform. Viewers do not perform."45 The Court added
that "while both broadcaster and viewer play crucial roles in the total
television process, a line is drawn between them."46 Fortnightly was
not functionally equivalent to a broadcaster, said the Court, as it only
"enhances the viewer's capacity to receive the broadcaster's signals;
. . .- " In fact, "[b]roadcasters select the programs to be viewed; CATV
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, to accompany S. 22, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., (1976), at 89. (emphasis
added).
For a discussion of the method of the first distribution of § I II cable royalties by the
Copyright Royalty Tribunal, see generally Koppany, A Methodology To Their Madness: The
First Copyright Royalty Tribunal and Distribution of Cable Rovaly Fees, 15 BEv. HILLS
B.A.J. 466 (1981). See also Meyer, The Feat ofHoudini or How the New Act Disentangles the
CATV-Copyright Knot, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 545 (1977); 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 34, at
§ 8.18[E], at 8-207-37; Note, The Copyright Royalty Tribunal: Achieving Equilibrium between
Cable and Copyright Interests, I Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 147 (1981).
42. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 396-97.
43. Id at 397.
44. Id (emphasis added).
45. Id at 398. (footnotes omitted).
46. Id at 398-99.
47. The Court underscored the functional dissimilarity of CATV systems and broadcast-
ers by quoting from Intermountain Broadcasting & Television Corp. v. Idaho Microwave,
Inc., 196 F. Supp. 315, 325 (S.D. Idaho 1961):
[Broadcasters] and [CATV systems] are not engaged in the same kind of business.
They operate in different ways for different purposes.
[Broadcasters] are in the business of selling their broadcasting time and facilities to
the sponsors to whom they look for their profits. They do not and cannot charge
the public for their profits. They do not and cannot charge the public for their
broadcasts which are beamed directly, indiscriminately and without charge
through the air to any and all reception sets of the public as they may be equipped
to receive them.
[CATV systems], on the other hand, have nothing to do with sponsors, program
content or arrangement. They sell a community antenna service to a segment of
the public for which [broadcasters'] programs were intended but which are unable,
because of location or topographical condition, to receive them without rebroad-
cast or other relay service by community antennae. ...
Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 400 n.28.
[Vol. 3
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systems carry, without editing, whatever programs they receive." 4 The
CATV system considered in this framework was held not to have per-
formed the motion pictures it received and made available to its
subscribers.49
As to the aggrieved copyright owner in Fortnightly, the Court reit-
erated the fact that the copyright law does "not give a copyright holder
control over all uses of his copyrighted work."50
Although the Court couched its decision in terms of thefunction of
a CATV system, the Court in fact considered and even analyzed the
"quantitative contribution" CATV systems make to the television
broadcast-reception process.5 The Court went so far as to distinguish
Jewell-La Salle,52 as it should have, for an important reason other than
the obvious difference between radio and television. The Court implic-
itly recognized that the defendant hotel in Jewell-La Salle, by tuning in
on the radio broadcast and channeling the music throughout the hotel,
did all there was to be done in bringing the music to its guests, and a
great deal at that.53 In Fortnightly, the CATV service was more an
intermediary; the subscriber's act in turning on the television set was
still necessary to complete the chain in the broadcast-reception process.
"Members of the public," the Court explained, "by means of television
sets and antennas that they themselves provide, receive the broad-
caster's signals and reconvert them into visible images and audible
sounds of the program."54 Arguably, the quantitative contribution of
48. Id. at 400.
49. Id at 400-01 n.30. The Court took issue with the dissent, which objected to the
majority opinion's failure to either adhere to Jewell-La Salle or overrule it; the Court
responded:
It is said in dissent that, "Our major object... should be to do as little damage as
possible to traditional copyright principles and to business relationships, until Con-
gress legislates .... " But existing "business relationships" would hardly be pre-
served by extending a questionable 35-year-old decision that in actual practice has
not been applied outside its own factual context . . . so as retroactively to impose
copyright infringement liability where it has never been acknowledged to existbefore. . ...
Id at 401 n.30. (emphasis added).
50. 1d at 393 and n.8, citing Fawcett Publications v. Elliot Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp.
717 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Hayden v. Chalfant Press, Inc., 281 F.2d 543, 547-48 (9th Cir. 1960).
The Court observed that "'[tihe fundamental is that 'use' is not the same thing as 'infringe-
ment,' that use short of infringement is to be encouraged.... .. (quoting B. KAPLAN, AN
UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT at 57 (1967).)
51. For instance, the Court noted that "[t]he effective range of the broadcast is deter-
mined by the combined contribution of the equipment employed by the broadcaster and that
supplied by the viewer." 392 U.S. at 398. (emphasis added).
52. Id at 396 n.18.
53. Id
54. Id at 397-98.
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the CATV system in Fortnightly was not as complete as that of the
defendant hotel in Jewell-La Salle.
Justice Fortas, dissenting from the majority opinion, found no per-
suasive distinction between the quantitative contributions in Jewell-La
Salle and in Fortnightly:
As I understand [Jewell-La Salle], the holding was that the
use of mechanical equipment to extend a broadcast to a sig-
nificantly wider public than the broadcast would otherwise
enjoy constitutes a "performance" of the material originally
broadcast. I believe this decision stands squarely in the path
of the route which the majority today traverses. If a CATV
system performs a function "little different from that served
by the equipment generally furnished by a television viewer,"
and if that is to be the test, then it seems to me that a master
radio set attached by wire to numerous other sets in various
rooms of a hotel cannot be distinguished.55
Justice Fortas was equally unimpressed with the Court's "attempts to
diminish the compelling authority of Buck v. Jewell-La Salle, by refer-
ring to a vague footnote in that opinion to the effect that the Court
might not have found a 'performance' if the original broadcast, ...
had been authorized by the copyright holder-as it was not."5 6 Ac-
cording to Justice Fortas, "the interpretation of the term 'perform' can-
not logically turn on the question whether the material that is used is
licensed or not licensed."" The television broadcasting stations in
Fortnightly were licensed. Justice Fortas believed that this fact should
not have stood in the way of a finding of "performance."
In conclusion, Justice Fortas urged that the Court's holding cannot
logically be extended to protect CATV systems that import distant sig-
nals, rather than simply enhance impeded local signals.58 He feared
that such an extension of the Court's holding would unfairly upset the
competitive balance between CATV systems and "local broadcasting
stations which must pay, directly or indirectly, for copyright
licenses. .... 
Six years later in Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting
55. Id at 406 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
56. Id at 406 n.5.
57. Id.
58. By importing distant signals, Justice Fortas explained, "the CATV is performing a
function different from a simple antenna for, by hypothesis, the antenna could not pick up
the signals of the distant licensed broadcaster and enable CATV patrons to receive them in
their homes." Id. at 407.
59. Id. at 403-04.
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Systems, Inc. ,6 the Supreme Court decided that such an extension of
its holding in Fortnightly was warranted. The Court held that (under
the 1909 Act) cable television operators who import distant signals are
free from copyright liability.6 The Court stated:
By importing signals that could not normally be received with
current technology in the community it served, a CATV sys-
tem does not for copyright purposes, alter the function it per-
forms for its subscribers . . . . The reception and
rechanneling of these signals for simultaneous viewing is es-
sentially a viewerfunction, irrespective of the distance between
the broadcasting station and the ultimate viewer.62
The copyright owners argued that by importing distant signals and
rechanneling them into secondary markets, CATV systems would di-
lute the possibility of subsequent syndications through local television
broadcasting stations because a program's appeal diminishes with each
successive showing in any given market.6 3 The Court was not per-
suaded. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, observed "that dilution
or dislocation of markets does not have the direct economic or copy-
right significance that this argument ascribes to it."' Justice Stewart
explained that the copyright owners or their licensees are not paid di-
rectly by the viewers but indirectly by sponsors.61 "[Blroadcasters
whose reception ranges have been extended by means of 'distant' signal
CATV rechanneling will merely have a different and larger viewing
60. 415 U.S. 394 (1974). In 1969, after Fortnightly but before Teleprompter, a district
court in Washington held that although a cable system's retransmission did not amount to
an infringing act, by reason of Fortnightly, the making of a videotape reproduction in prepa-
ration for its nonsimultaneous retransmission did infringe the copyright owner's right to
reproduce its copyrighted material under the 1909 Act. Walt Disney Prods. v. Alaska Tele-
vision Network, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 1973 (W.D. Wash. 1969). Seegenerally § 1(d) of the 1909
Act.
As for the statement by the court in Walt Disney Prods. that "[w]hether or not the
dissemination constitutes a 'performance' as the word is used in section I(d) of the 1909 Act
is immaterial," Professor Nimmer finds it "difficult to see why the issue of whether dissemi-
nation constitutes 'performance' was immaterial." 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 34, at
§ 8.181A], at 8-193 n.30.
61. Teleprompter, just as Fortnightly, has been preempted by section 111 of the Act, and
copyright owners now are entitled to receive cable television royalties from compulsory
licensees and others and may sue unlicensed users for copyright infringement. Professor
Nimmer notes that "[tihe operative language of the compulsory license is broad enough to
include local as well as distant signals." 2 M. NIMMER, Supra note 34, at 8.18[EI[91[bl n.261
(1981). See generally § 1 I(C)(1) of the Act.
62. 415 U.S. at 408. (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 410-11.
64. Id at 411.
65. Id at 411-12.
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market. 66 Consequently, the cost of sponsoring a program with a mar-
ket augmented by distant signal rechanneling should increase, indi-
rectly resulting in greater reward to copyright owners, which will
compensate for any dilution of the syndication market.
Justice Fortas had stepped down from the high Court before Tele-
prompter. His vacant seat was filled by Justice Blackmun who, dissent-
ing in part, carried the torch Justice Fortas ignited in Fortnightly. But
for Fortnightly, Justice Blackmun, too, would have relied on the unani-
mous decision in Jewell-La Salle.68 Even "[w]ith Fortnightly on the
books," Justice Blackmun stated he "would confine it 'to its precise
facts and leave an extension or modification to the Congress.' "69
Justice Douglas also dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger, and
warned that "[tihe Court today makes an extraordinary excursion into
the legislative field."7 Whatever one thinks bf Fortnightly," wrote Jus-
tice Douglas, "we should not take the next step necessary to give immu-
nity io the present CATV organizations. '"' The dissent was not
convinced by the economic explanation offered by the majority of the
Court. Instead, Justice Douglas took the position that:
Rechanneling by CATV of the pirated programs robs the
copyright owner of his chance for monetary rewards through
advertising rates on rebroadcasts in a distant area and gives
those monetary rewards to the group that has pirated the pro-
gram . . . . [7"he result reads the Copyright Act out of exist-
encefor CATV. That may or may not be desirable public
policy. But it is a legislative decision that not even a rampant
judicial activism should entertain.72
The Functional Test Applied in the Radio Reception Context
In 1975, the Supreme Court again applied its functional test in
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken." The Court held that a per-
formance had not occurred where a small fast-food restaurant used a
single home-type receiving apparatus with four ceiling speakers. The
66. Id. at 412-13.
67. Id. at 413. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, apologized for any economic dis-
ruption Teleprompter might cause, and urged Congress to intervene. Congress chose to in-
tervene by enacting section 111 of the Act. See generaly supra notes 41 and 61.
68. Id at 415. (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 416. (Douglas, J. dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.).
71. Id.
72. Id at 419. (emphasis added).
73. 422 U.S. 151 (1974).
[Vol. 3
RADIO PLA Y
Court attempted to reconcile its decision with Je'ell-La Salle, Fort-
nightly and Teleprompter."
The Court distinguished Jewell-La Salle on the ground that, there,
the radio broadcasting station was unlicensed, whereas in the instant
case the broadcaster was licensed.75 As for Fortnightly and Tele-
prompter, the Court reiterated the functional test it applied in those two
cases and found that the restaurateur was functionally the equivalent of
a listener.76 " 'Certainly those who listen do not perform, and therefore
do not infringe,'" the Court observed."
TheAiken Court interestingly chose not to expressly overrule Jew-
ell-La Salle and instead assumed "for present purposes that the Jewell-
La Salle decision retains authoritative force in a factual situation like
that in which it arose."'78 The factual situation the Aiken Court seemed
to refer to, was that the radio station in Jewell-La Salle was unli-
censed,"9 Recall that in Jewell-La Salle, Justice Brandeis recognized
that "[i]f the copyrighted composition had been broadcast . . . with
plaintiffs' consent, a licensefor its commercial reception might possibly
have been implied.""0 Justice Brandeis had based this proposition on
the earlier Buck v. Debaum decision. There, the district court found
that by licensing the radio station, the plaintiffs "impliedly sanctioned
and consented to any 'pick up' out of the air that was possible in radio
reception."'" Nevertheless, Jewell-La Salle and Aiken cannot be rec-
onciled by this distinction.
Station WKJK-FM in Pittsburgh, to which Aiken's set was tuned,
74. Judge Weis' opinion at the district court level in Aiken interestingly begins:
"Whether this is a 'Jewel' of a case for the plaintiffs or a 'Fortnightly' event for the defen-
dant is the question to be resolved .. " Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 356 F.
Supp. 271, 274 (W.D. Pa. 1973). The district court concluded that it was a 'Jewell' of a case.
The Supreme Court disagreed.
75. 422 U.S. at 160-61.
76. Id at 161-62. Quoting from the Aiken court of appeals opinion, which was ap-
proved here, the Supreme Court reasoned:
"If Fortnightly, with its elaborate CATV plant and Teleprompter with its even
more sophisticated and extended technological and programming facilities were
not 'performing,' then logic dictates that no 'performance' resulted when the
restauranteur merely activated his restaurant radio."
(quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 500 F.2d 127, 137 (3rd Cir. 1974)). The
Court seems to have applied, at least in part, a "quantitative contribution" analysis, despite
its insistence that its decision turned solely on a functional analysis.
77. Id at 159 (quoting Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. General Electric Co., 16 F.2d 829
(S.D.N.Y. 1926)).
78. Id. at 160. (footnote omitted).
79. See generally 1d. at 160-61.
80. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. (emphasis added).
81. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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was licensed by ASCAP82 to transmit radio broadcasts of its members'
compositions.8 3 Yet the license granted to WKJK-FM, similar to other
such licenses granted since the decision in Buck v. Debaum, contained
restrictive language expressly negating any implied authorization pro-
tecting secondary uses of the licensed broadcasts.84 Although a restric-
tive clause of this type would negate only an implied-in-fact license,
there is no authority that the courts are willing to find a license im-
plied-in-law, such that a restrictive clause in a license agreement would
be ineffective. The Aiken Court clearly did not reach the question
whether a license for secondary transmission can be implied-in-law.85
Such restrictive clauses would seem to effectively foreclose any argu-
ment that the secondary use of a licensed broadcast is authorized by the
82. ASCAP (American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers), BMI (Broadcast
Music, Inc.) and SESAC, Inc. (Society of European Stage Authors and Performers, Inc.) are
"performing rights societies" which on behalf of their respective members issue nonexclu-
sive blanket licenses to, and collect oyalties from, those authorized to perform publicly the
members' nondramatic musical compositions. See § 1I6(c)(2) of the Act. For a discussion
of the criteria for determining whether a work is nondramatic, see Gonzales, Compulsory
Licensing of Sound Recordings under the New CopyrightAct, 1 S.C. ENT. L.J. 7-10 (1977); 3
M. NIMMER, supra note 34, at § 10.10[E]. For a discussion of ASCAP, see K-91, Inc. v.
Gershwin Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d I (9th Cir. 1967).
The blanket licensing practice of the performing rights societies in connection with tele-
vision broadcasts of their respective members' musical compositions has recently run afoul
of the antitrust laws. See Buffalo Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers, 546 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), appeal docketed, No. 83-7058 (2d
Cir. 1983). A thorough analysis of Buffalo Broadcasting and its extensive ramifications is
found in Sobel, The Music Business and the Sherman Act. An Analysis of the "Economic
Realities" of Blanket Licensing, 3 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 1 (1983) (in this volume).
83. 422 U.S. at 152 (footnote omitted).
84. The Court reproduced the "customary" language of ASCAP's license agreement
with the Pittsburgh radio broadcasting station:
Nothing herein contained shall be construed as authorizing LICENSEE [WKFJ-
FM] to grant to others any right to reproduce or perform publicly for profit by any
means, method or process whatsoever, any of the musical compositions licensed
hereunder or as authorizing any receiver of any radio broadcast to perform pub-
licly or reproduce the same for profit, by any means, method or process
whatsoever.
Id at 153, n.I.
By including restrictive clauses of this type in license agreements, ASCAP and the other
performing rights societies sought to circumvent the implied license doctrine formulated and
applied in Buck v. DeBaum, 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929). See generally supra notes 23 and
25 and accompanying text.
85. In fact, the district court in Society of European Stage Authors and Composers, Inc.
v. New York Hotel Statler Co., 19 F. Supp. 1, 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1937), not only rejected the
implied-in-law license theory but also concluded that a similar restrictive contractual provi-
sion gave commercial receivers of broadcast copyrighted music ample notice to foreclose a
claim that they had an implied license. The court stated that copyright infringement de-
pends not upon a broadcaster's rights but upon a receiver's acts. Id.
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copyright owner.8 6 The Aiken Court failed to address this point.'
Pursuant to this analysis, the secondary use of the broadcast music
in both Jewell-La Salle and Aiken was unauthorized. However, the
result in Aiken was not the same as that in Jewell-La Salle. The Aiken
Court could have reconciled the decisions by applying its earlier quan-
titative test. Jewell-La Salle could have been distinguished on the
ground that there the music received was channeled throughout the ho-
tel, and thus the secondary use involved a significantly greater "quanti-
tative contribution" than that in Aiken, where there was mere
intramural radio play enjoyed by far fewer persons. The Court ignored
this distinction, however, as well as the fact that Aiken was not author-
ized to publicly perform the plaintiffs' copyrighted music.
The Supreme Court inAiken also ignored its earlier observation in
Jewell-La Salle that "[n]o reason is suggested why there may not be
more than one liability.""8 Instead, the Aiken Court concluded:
[T]o hold that all in Aiken's position "performed" these musi-
cal compositions would be to authorize the sale of an untold
number of licenses for what is basically a single public rendi-
tion of a copyrighted work. The exaction of such multiple trib-
ute would go far beyond what is required for the economic
protection of copyright owners . 8.. 9
In addition, the Court believed it would be inequitable to impose
infringement liability on Aiken as he "would have no sure way of pro-
tecting himself from liability for copyright infringement except by
keeping his radio set turned off."9 Here, again, the Supreme Court
earlier addressed this problem when, in Jewell-La Salle, Justice Bran-
deis warned that one who "tunes in on a radio broadcasting station...
necessarily assumes the risk that in doing so he may infringe the per-
forming rights of another."'"
The Aiken Court nevertheless declined to overrule Jewell-La Salle,
or at least more articulately distinguish it, and acknowledge that Aiken
represents, as it does, a judicial compromise exempting a small com-
86. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
87. The Aiken Court made no reference to New York Hotel Statler Co., which would
have stood in the Court's way had the Court chose to find a license implied-in-law.
88. 283 U.S. at 198.
89. 422 U.S. at 162-63. (footnote omitted). The Court added that "such multiple tribute
. would be wholly at odds with the balanced congressional purpose behind the Act." Id
at 163-64. See generally supra note 19.
90. id. at 162.
91. 283 U.S. at 198-99. (citations omitted).
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mercial establishment employing a single home-type receiving appara-
tus with a simple speaker system for intramural radio play.
Justice Blackmun concurred in the result reached by the Aiken
Court but would have limited Teleprompter and Fortnightly "to the
particular industry that spawned them" rather than extending those de-
cisions into radio broadcasting and "effectively" overruling Jewell-La
Salle.92 As a matter of form, Justice Blackmun could not "understand
why the Court is so reluctant to do directly what it obviously is doing
indirectly, namely, to overrule Jewell-La Salle."93 "I think we should
be realistic and forthright," wrote Justice Blackmun, "and, if Jewell-La
Salle is in the way, overrule it."94
In Chief Justice Burger's dissent, joined by Justice Douglas, the
previously noted irreconcilability of Jewell-La Salle and Aiken was rec-
ognized.95 The Chief Justice emphasized that Jewell-La Salle "is
squarely relevant here since the license at issue expressly negated any
right on the part of the broadcaster to further license performances by
those who commercially receive and distribute broadcast music. "96 In
addition, the Chief Justice believed that Fortnightly and Teleprompter
were not controlling because Aiken "was more than a 'passive benefici-
ary.' "" "He took the transmission and used that transmission for
commercial entertainment and his own profit enterprise, through a
multispeaker audio system specifically designed for his business pur-
poses."98 The Chief Justice reiterated the "unequivocal" holding in
Jewell-La Salle, that persons such as Aiken necessarily assume the risk
that by tuning in on a broadcasting station they may "infringe the per-
forming rights of another."99
Perhaps most importantly, Chief Justice Burger urged congres-
sional intervention to provide the necessary " 'architectural improvisa-
tion which only legislation can accomplish.' ",0
92. 422 U.S. at 166 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
93. Id
94. Id at 167.
95. Id at 169 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.).
96. Id (emphasis added).
97. Id, quoting Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television Corp., 392 U.S. at 399.
98. Id (footnote omitted).
99. Id at 170, quoting Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. at 199. (citation
omitted).
100. Id, quoting Forinighily, 392 U.S. at 408 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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SECTION 110(5) AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Congressional Intervention in the Muddied Waters
Congress attempted to intervene on at least eighteen occasions be-
tween the time Jewell-La Salle was decided and 1957, when efforts to
revise the 1909 Act were just beginning; none of the bills was
enacted. 'i
The pre-Aiken Senate bill'0 2 would have codified Jewell-La Salle.
It would have exempted performances by means of radio play in com-
mercial establishments where a single home-type receiving apparatus
was used, no direct charge was made to see or hear the transmission
and the transmission thus received was not further transmitted to the
public.0 3 The post-Aiken Senate Report explained:
[T]his exemption would not apply where broadcasts are trans-
mitted by means of loudspeakers or similar devices in such
establishments as bus terminals, supermarkets, factories...
hotels, restaurants, and quick-service food shops of the type
involved in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken.
The House Committee proposed a revision of the Senate bill such
that liability would be imposed where "the performance or display is
further transmitted beyond the place where the receiving apparatus is
located."'0 5 The House Committee's proposed amendatory language
would have been more in keeping with the particular facts in Jewell-La
Salle, where the music was channeled throughout the hotel and there-
fore "beyond the place where the receiving apparatus is located." The
House Report also stated that any use of commercial sound equipment,
or conversion of a home-type receiver into its equivalent, would lead to
copyright infringement liability.o6 The House Committee enumerated
several considerations useful in determining the applicability of the
101. H.R. 12549, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1931); H.R. 10364, H.R. 10740, H.R. 10976, H.R.
11948, H.R. 12094, and H.R. 12425, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1932); S. 3047, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1935); S. 7, S. 2031, H.R. 2695, H.R. 3699, H.R. 5275, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937); H.R.
8263 and H.R. 9665, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1940); H.R. 3454, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
For an informative discussion of the legislative history of § 110(5), see Korman, supra
note 9.
102. S. 22, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975).
103. Id. at § 110(5).
104. 122 CONG. REC. 1546 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1976).
105. S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) in the House of Representatives, § 110(5)(B). H.R.
REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976). The Senate bill as amended by the House is
reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
106. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1976).
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proposed rule to particular cases. 10 7
A Conference Committee met to reconcile the House and Senate
bills. ' One commentator notes that the Conference Committee was
aware not only of Aiken but also of the then-pending ASCAP litigation
involving the commercial background music industry, and of Muzak's
position that it was being injured by Aiken; the Aiken decision permit-
ted potential subscribers to background music services to use music
broadcast by radio stations instead, where no royalty payment was
required.0 9
To accommodate the interests of commercial background music
companies such as Muzak, and at the same time recognizing the desira-
bility of a de minimis" exemption for small commercial establish-
ments using a home-type receiving apparatus with a simple, intramural
speaker system, the Conference Committee adopted the Senate version
of section 110(5), which provided a more limited exemption than the
House version. The House version would have imposed liability where
music received was further transmitted "beyond the place where the re-
107. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
108. CONF. REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
109. Korman, supra note 9, at 533 (footnote omitted). During Aiken's litigation, more
than two hundred commercial background music operators, including Muzak and its fran-
chisees, commenced a proceeding to reduce the license fees they were, required to pay to
copyright owners. United States v. ASCAP, 1973-2 Trade Cas. 95, 212 (S.D.N.V. 1973).
The background music operators argued that they should not be required to pay license fees
at a greater percentage rate than that paid by radio stations. Id at 95, 273. They also
claimed they were suffering unfairly by competition with commercial establishments that
enjoyed royalty-free radio. 1d. The Aiken exemption theoretically resulted in a reduction in
business for Muzak and other background music operators, as royalty-free xadio play of-
fered an economically preferable means of musical entertainment for customers and em-
ployees of commercial establishments.
Interestingly, the background music operators wanted Aiken to prevail, as he did, so
that they could introduce additional evidence theoretically compelling a reduction in their
license fees such that they could compete with royalty-free radio. Petitioner's brief at 10,
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 500 F.2d 127 (1974) aff'd, 422 U.S. 127 (1975). In
fact, Muzak and other background music operators had been granted leave to argue Aiken's
cause as amici curiae in the district court. 356 F. Supp. 271, 273 (W.D. Pa. 1973). Muzak
actually financed and handled Aiken's successful appeal.
As for the outcome of the rate adjustment proceeding, the matter was resolved by con-
sent after § 110(5) was enacted. The result was an increase of license fees payable by Muzak
and similar music operators. The argument advanced by the background music operators-
that they would suffer by the competitive edge enjoyed by royalty-free radio-was no longer
persuasive, as only small commercial establishments such as Aiken's now enjoy the exemp-
tion; other establishments must pay license fees for radio reception.
110. The House Report had stated that "[tihe basic rationale of [§ 110(5)] is that the sec-
ondary use of the transmission by turning on an ordinary receiver in public is so remote and
minimal that no further liability should be imposed." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 86 (1976). (emphasis added).
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ceiving apparatus is located "'I The Senate version, however, which
was adopted, is less discriminating and imposes liability in any case
where the music received "is further transmitted to the public."2 A
Senate Report suggests that there is a further transmission to the pub-
lic, "where broadcasts are transmitted to substantial audiences by
means of loudspeakers covering a wide area."
'" 3
The Conference Report recognized that a small commercial estab-
lishment such as the one in Aiken which "merely augmented a home-
type receiver" would be exempt but that establishments large enough to
justify subscription to a commercial background service would be fully
liable.I 4 The Conference Committee emphasized the size of the com-
mercial establishment and in doing so theoretically accommodated the
interests of commercial background music services, by minimizing the
competitive edge larger commercial establishments would otherwise
enjoy by using royalty-free radio reception rather than background
music services which charge a fee." 5
The Reemergence and Codgfcation of the Quantitative Test
Both the House and Senate bills codified the quantitative test for-
mulated and applied in Jewell-La Salle. The functional test applied in
Fortnightly, Teleprompter and Aiken no longer has any application in
the radio reception context. In fact, the House Report concluded that
its bill "completely overturned" the basis for the Aiken decision. The
Report states in relevant part:
I ll. CONF. REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1976). (emphasis added). This lan-
guage would have been consistent with Jewell-La Salle where the music received by the
defendant hotel was transmitted throughout the hotel and therefore "beyond the place
where the receiving apparatus is located." Only intramural radio reception, as in Herbert v.
Shanley Co., would have been potentially exempt.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. S. REP. No. 93-983, p. 130 (1974). Quoted in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. at 169 n.3 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, jointed by Douglas, J.).
114. CONF. REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1976):
With respect to 110(5), the conference substitute conforms to the language in
the Senate bill. It is the intent of the conferees that a small commercial establish-
ment of the type involved in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
151 (1975), which merely augmented a home-type receiver and which was not of
sufficient size to justify, as a practical matter, subscription to a commercial back-
ground music service, would be exempt. However, where the public communica-
tion was by means of something other than a home-type receiving apparatus, or
where the establishment actually makes a further transmission to the public, the
exemption would not apply.
115. As of about 1980, Muzak's monthly subscription fee for retail clothing stores was
approximately $30-445. Appellee's brief at 19, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. United States Shoe
Corp., 678 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1982).
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The majority of the Supreme Court in the Aiken case based its
decision on a narrow construction of the word "perform" in
the 1909 statute. This basis for the decision is completely
overturned by the present bill and its broad definition of "per-
form" in section 101. The Conference Committee . .. ac-
cepts the traditional pre-Aiken, interpretation of the Jewell-La
Salle decision, under which public communication by means
other than a home receiving set, or further transmission of a
broadcast to the public, is considered an infringing act. 6
The House Report nevertheless approved the result in Aiken but
found the factual situation there "to represent the outer limit of the
exemption, ..1.17 The Report explained:
Under the particular fact situation in the Aiken case, assum-
ing a small commercial establishment and the use of a home
receiver with four ordinary loudspeakers grouped within a
relatively narrow circumference from the set, it is intended
that the performances would be exempt under clause (5).
However, the Committee considers this fact situation to repre-
sent the outer limit of the exemption, and believes that the line
should be drawn at that point."
Jewell-La Salle's functional test therefore lives on, though its im-
pact has been tempered by legislative intervention, providing an ex-
emption only under circumstances similar to that found in Aiken.
Section 110(5) has been narrowly construed from its inception.
Section 110(5) of the 1976 Copyright Act
The Act, which took effect on January 1, 1978, includes section
110(5), as well as other limitations on copyright owners' exclusive
rights. 9 Section 110 provides in relevant part:
116. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 87 (1975).
One pre-Aiken decision that followed the letter and spirit ofJewell-La Salle was Society
of European Stage Authors and Composers, Inc. v. New York Hotel Statler Co., 19 F. Supp.
I (S.D.N.Y. 1937). See supra note 85.
117. Id
118. Id (emphasis added).
119. The exclusive rights of copyright owners are subject to the limitations provided in
§§ 107-118 of the Act (e.g. §§ 107 (fair use); Ill (compulsory license for secondary transmis-
sions); 115 (compulsory license for making and distributing phonorecords)).
For analyses of§ 111, see note 41 supra. For analyses of§ 115, see Berg, Moral Rights
and the Compulsory Licensefor Phonorecords, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 67. 1979: Gonzales,
"Compulsory Licensing of Sound Recordings Under the New Act, I ENT. L.J. 7 (1977); Green-
man, Jr. & Deutsch, The Copyright Royalty Tribunal and the Statutory Mechanical Royalty
History and Prospect, I CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. (1982); Henn, "The Compulsorr License
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Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the following
are not infringements of copyright:
(5) communication of a transmission embodying a perfor-
mance or display of a work by the public reception of the
transmission on a single receiving apparatus of a kind com-
monly used in private homes, unless-
(A) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmis-
sion; or
(B) the transmission thus received is further transmitted
to the public;.. 120
Section 110(5) recognizes that radio play in a commercial estab-
lishment constitutes a "performance" of the music thus received. The
courts no longer must grapple with defining "performance" in this con-
text. Instead, the province of the courts will be to further define the
scope of the exemption. The exemption applies as long as a single
home-type receiving apparatus is used, the transmission thus received
is not further transmitted to the public and, of course, no direct charge
is made to hear the music. Congress did offer some guidelines in addi-
tion to having emphasized that the factual situation in Aiken represents
the "outer limit" of the exemption. The House Committee explained
that some of the considerations include:
[T]he size, physical arrangement, and noise level of the areas
within the establishment where the transmissions are made
audible or visible, and the extent to which the receiving appa-
Provisions of the United States Copyright Law, Copy. Office Study. No. 5, at 18; Manchester,
Legalized Piracy The Compulsory Licensing of Phonorecords Under the Copyright Revision
Act of 1976, 19 IDEA 149 (19-); Meyers, Sound Recordings Under the New Copyright Act, 22
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 573 (1977); Thorne, Compulsory Licensing: The Music Makers as Money
Makers, 5 L.A. LAW. 11 (1982), reprinted in 3 ENT. & SPORTS LAw., Winter 1983, at 11;
Note, Compulsory Licensing of Musical Compositions For Phonorecords Under the Copyright
Act of 1976, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 683 (1979).
Another limitation on the exclusive rights of copyright owners is found in § 110(7)-the
recordstore exemption. Section 110(7) exempts performances of nondramatic musical com-
positions by retail record stores and other commercial establishments where the purpose of
the performance is to demonstrate the commercially exploited product and thereby promote
sales. Section 110(7) exempts a:
[p]erformance of a nondramatic musical work by a vending establishment
open to the public at large without any direct or indirect admission charge, where
the sale purpose is to promote the retail sale of copies or phonorecords of the work,
and the performance is not transmitted beyond the place where the establishment
is located and is within the immediate area where the sale is occurring.
For a discussion of the legislative history and judicial antecedents of § 110(7), see Korman,
supra note 9, at 534-36.
120. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (1976) (emphasis added).
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ratus is altered or augmented for the purpose of improving
the aural or visual quality of the performance for individual
members of the public using those areas.' 2 '
However articulate this legislative history, there was an "obvious
gap in the statute to be filled in by the courts."22 For instance, would a
commercial establishment using only four simply-mounted speakers
for intramural radio play, enjoy the exemption if the size of the estab-
lishment minimally exceeded that of Aiken's fast-food restaurant? Ap-
pellate consideration of section 110(5) was just around the corner.
NARROW CONSTRUCTION OF THE SECTION 110(5) EXEMPTION
Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc. 123 provided the first reported decision
interpreting section 110(5). The Gap stores comprise a chain of ap-
proximately 420 clothing stores. Radio play in each store is effected by
means of a master receiver connected to loudspeakers recessed in cavi-
ties in the store's ceiling. The average size of all Gap stores is 3,500
square feet. In one of the infringing stores, the size of which is 2,769
square feet, radio play of the plaintiffs' musical composition was ef-
fected. The plaintiffs sued to enjoin the allegedly infringing radio play.
The plaintiffs prevailed. The court of appeals affirmed.
The court of appeals recognized that section 106(4) of the Act
"grants copyright owners the exclusive rights publicly to perform, or
authorize the performance of, their copyrighted works," and that radio
play falling within the scope of section 110(5) is exempt from section
106(4).124 The court also recognized that Congress expressly consid-
ered the scope of section 110(5) by referring to Aiken.2 5 Aiken's fast-
food restaurant was only 1,055 square feet with a commercial area
open to the public of only 620 square feet where radio programs were
played by means of a single home-type receiving apparatus connected
to four speakers simply mounted on the restaurant's ceiling; the court
noted that the House Committee sponsoring the Act emphasized that
the factual situation in Aiken represented the "outer limit" of the sec-
121. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 87 (1976).
122. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 169, n.3 (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing, joined by Douglas, J., construing similar definitional attempts by the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, S. REP. No. 93-983 at 130 (1974)).
123. 668 F.2d 84.




tion 110(5) exemption.' 26
The court concluded that "the Gap store in the instant case ex-
ceeds this 'outer limit' as Judge Gagliardi properly held" in the district
court.127 The Gap store "is much larger than the shop in Aiken," the
court added, "which . . indicates that Congress did not intend it to be
exempted from the mandates of the copyright laws pursuant to
§ 1 10(5).
' 128
The court also determined that the Gap store is "'of sufficient size
to justify, as a practical matter, a subscription to a commercial back-
ground music service,' a factor which further suggests Congress did not
intend that the Gap store would be exempt."' 29 The court did not,
however, offer any guidelines for determining just what size a commer-
cial establishment must be to justify subscription to a background mu-
sic service.
The decision in Sailor Music rested on three grounds. First, the
Gap store was far larger than the fast-food restaurant in Aiken. Con-
gress had pronounced that the size of a commercial establishment is at
least partly determinative. 3 Second, the store was large enough, the
court found, " 'to justify, as a practical matter, a subscription to a com-
mercial background service,'" such as Muzak.' 3' Third, although the
court mentioned but did not analyze this fact, the receiving apparatus
in the Gap store was more elaborate than the one in iken. 32 The
master receiver in the Gap store was connected to speakers recessed
behind wired grids in cavities in the store's ceiling; 3 3 it was not a sim-
ple home-type receiving apparatus.
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. United States Shoe Corp.
In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. United States Shoe Corp. ,'3' decided
one year after Sailor Music, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's order granting the plaintifi's motion for summary judgment in a
copyright infringement action against four retail apparel stores operat-
ing under the name of Casual Comer. Each of the stores used a single
126. Id (citation omitted).
127. Id
128. Id.
129. id (citations omitted). See generally supra notes 114 & 115 and accompanying text.
130. See generally supra note 113 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 129.
132. 668 F.2d at 85-86; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
133. 668 F.2d at 86.
134. 678 F.2d 816.
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radio receiver connected to four or more "widely separated speakers" 35
mounted in the store's ceiling. The court of appeals did not disclose the
fact that the speakers were recessed in cavities in the ceilings of each of
the stores, 136 as they were in Sailor Music, nor did it disclose the square
footage of the defendant stores, which was substantial. 37 The court
concluded that the defendant stores exceeded the "outer limit" of the
section 110(5) exemption because their sound systems were "a type not
commonly used in private homes, . *..1.,38 The court further stated
that the size and nature of the defendant stores justified the use of a
commercial backgroand music system.'39 In so holding, the court ex-
pressly relied on Sailor Music, which involved nearly identical facts.
The decision in U.S. Shoe Corp. also had constitutional dimen-
sion. The defendant contended that section 110(5) was unconstitution-
ally void for vagueness in that its language provided no indicia for
determining whether a given receiving apparatus is "of a kind com-
monly used in private homes." The court found no merit in this con-
tention. "We believe that a person of ordinary intelligence," said the
court, "can understand and apply the requirements of the Act."'
140
CONCLUSION
Section 110(5) provides a limited music copyright haven. Com-
mercial establishments within its reach are free to entertain their cus-
tomers and employees with royalty-free radio play. Articulate
legislative history did much to define the scope of the exemption, as did
the decisions in Sailor Music and U.S. Shoe Corp. Nevertheless, the
possibility of further judicial construction should not be ruled out.
135. Id at 817.
136. Appellee's Brief at 5, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 678 F.2d 816 (9th
Cir. 1982).
137. See supra note 15.
138. 678 F.2d at 817.
139. ld
140. Id
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